31.25% of the selected statutory work was incomplete
GAO assessed USDA and FDA against 16 selected cybersecurity requirements for the food and agriculture sector. The agencies met most, but partially met or did not meet five.
Five of 16 equals 31.25%. The ratio describes the selected requirements in GAO's framework, not the percentage of farms, processors or products that are insecure.
| Status | Requirements | Share |
|---|---|---|
| Met | 11 | 68.75% |
| Partly or not met | 5 | 31.25% |
| Total reviewed | 16 | 100% |
The gaps reach coordination and emergency readiness
GAO identified weaknesses in sharing threat information and preparing for disruptive cyber events. Those are sector-level responsibilities: food production and distribution cross private companies, state governments and two federal departments, so a technically secure individual facility does not solve the coordination problem.
The private-sector evidence came from six organizations and is not nationally generalizable. GAO used it to illuminate implementation, not to estimate a national failure rate.
The agencies split on the recommended response
GAO made five recommendations—two to USDA and three to HHS/FDA. HHS agreed. USDA disagreed and asked GAO to remove or redirect its two recommendations; GAO maintained them.
That disagreement creates a clear follow-up test: either USDA should implement the two actions or publish evidence showing another office has the authority and a measurable plan. The Scoop's calculation makes the incompleteness visible while preserving the limits of GAO's private-sector sample.
